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During the decade following World War I, a careful 
observer might well have feared the spiritual secession of 
America from European civilization. Certain New World 
countries, after establishing their political independence 
and reasonable autonomy in the economic sphere, appar-
ently dreamed of abandoning completely western civiliza-
tion in order to seek a new destiny. 
. . . Since the onset of economic disorder, this threat 
has lost much of its force. 
Georges Duhamel, 1937 
The French view of the New Deal has a special fascination for the 
American reader because it is the product of preoccupations and values 
which are substantially different from his own and from those of most 
American scholars who study the New Deal. The French observer, unlike 
his American counterparts, displayed almost no interest in whether the 
New Deal would cure the American Depression; he rarely gave a sys-
tematic account of the legislative enactments which together constitute 
the achievement of the Roosevelt administration, nor was he particularly 
concerned with assessing Roosevelt's place in the American liberal tradi-
tion. French interest in the New Deal stemmed largely from a desire to 
see how American civilization, which first emerged as a threat to the 
French way of life in the 1920's, was faring in the midst of the De-
pression. 
The French preoccupation with American civilization developed on 
the heels of a diplomatic falling-out between the two countries over the 
issues of War debts and disarmament. The French had bitterly and 
unsuccessfully opposed the American effort to collect the money loaned 
to France during World War I, while the Americans had been unsuccess-
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fui in convincing France that the road to peace lay through disarma-
ment. These political tensions helped to stimulate the rising fear of 
American imperialism after 1925. American loans and investments in 
Europe were only one aspect of American power on the Continent. 
Frenchmen were increasingly aware of new cultural trends in Europe 
which they labeled "Americanism.'' This term referred to a multitude 
of technological advances including such industrial processes as the 
moving assembly line and the Taylor System. In addition, the develop-
ment of the consumer society featuring the automobile, the movie and 
jazz were also considered manifestations of "Americanism." By the end 
of the decade Frenchmen had begun to identify American life exclu-
sively in terms of the technology which America was exporting; at the 
same time, France was urged by its experts on American culture to resist 
the advent of this technology as a form of cultural imperialism which 
would ultimately destroy the spiritual values of French civilization. 
Within the United States, Frenchmen identified an equally unattrac-
tive form of cultural imperialism which they also labeled "American-
ism," or, more frequently, "Puritanism." This development featured 
the struggle by Anglo-Saxon and Nordic elements to preserve their con-
trol over American civilization in the face of a strong challenge from 
"foreign" ethnic groups. The Prohibition amendment, immigration re-
striction and the conviction of Sacco and Vanzetti offended French ob-
servers because these measures were considered instances of a defensive 
reaction by the Anglo-Saxon majority. It seemed clear to Frenchmen 
that the native Americans believed in the inferiority of the Latin people 
and their customs, as well as other European immigrant groups. 
Preoccupied with the development of both varieties of Americanism 
in the late twenties, Frenchmen declined to discuss other areas of Amer-
ican life. As a result, America came to be exclusively identified in the 
French mind with Puritanism and the various aspects of mass society. 
While the interest in exploring the development of these forces during 
the New Deal accounts for the originality of the French perspective, it 
is also true that the definition of American behavior in such narrow 
terms created serious problems for French critics. As Pierre Lyautey 
pointed out: "The mistake of our reporters was to insist on finding in 
America the Americanism which was also spreading in Europe. . . . The 
French public was thus sometimes deceived about America. . . . A legend 
was created which could be summarized as follows: America is the 
country of standardization."1 
In attempting to understand the impact of the New Deal on both 
kinds of Americanism French observers found evidence of materialism 
and Puritanism in Roosevelt's America as well as developments which 
indicated the repudiation of these old values. The concept of Amer-
icanism, so strongly fixed in the French mind by 1932, was carried for-
ward after Roosevelt's inauguration to describe the main contours of 
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American civilization. When certain aspects of the New Deal appeared 
to repudiate Americanism, Frenchmen were quick to conclude that 
Roosevelt was engaged in a revolutionary undertaking. Refusing to 
abandon their old definition of American civilization, French observers 
argued simultaneously that the New Deal was a revolutionary rejection 
of old values and an affirmation of them. 
Among French observers who came to investigate the future of Amer-
icanism were a large number of professional journalists. Pierre Lyautey 
of Le Matin and Raymond Recouly of Le Temps, both large Paris dailies 
of a conservative persuasion, and three correspondents of liberal dailies-
Georges Boris of Le Quotidien, Robert de Saint Jean of Paris Soir and 
Emmanuel Bourcier of l'Intransigeant—all collected their observations 
into book-length studies. 
The most prestigious Frenchmen to witness and describe the New 
Deal were three future members of the French Academy: the novelists 
André Maurois and Jules Romains, and the political scientist André 
Siegfried. Maurois' visit to the United States in 1933 was his third in 
five years, while Romains, who taught at Mills College in the summer of 
1936, had seen America in silent dismay twelve years earlier. André 
Siegfried's first contact with the United States dated back to 1898; dur-
ing the twenties, Siegfried renewed his acquaintance with America and 
published the most respected study of the United States by a Frenchman: 
Les Etats-Unis d'aujourd'hui.2 He was no match, however, for his col-
league at the Collège de France, Bernard Fay, who was making his 
twenty-second visit to the United States in 1935. 
There were three other observers of the New Deal who had traveled 
extensively in America before the Depression. Two advocates of mass 
production and the assembly line, Henri Dubreuil and Emile Schreiber,3 
returned to see how the Depression had affected modern technology, 
while Bertrand de Jouvenel, who was later to become an enthusiastic 
defender of modernization, witnessed the end of Hoover's administration 
and the early days of the New Deal. 
Taken as a group, these observers practiced a variety of occupations 
including journalism, writing novels and biography, teaching and labor 
organizing. Various positions on the political spectrum, ranging from 
moderate socialism on the left to conservative republicanism on the 
right, were represented by the group. Moreover, conditions and timing 
of the visits were also diverse. The duration of the trips to America 
varied from a month to a year; some observers came as early as 1933, 
while others arrived only in 1936. Some came to teach, others as tourists, 
and still others as reporters. 
Despite these differences of circumstances, predispositions and in-
terests, however, certain patterns emerged from the discussion of the 
New Deal. All of the travelers agreed that it constituted a major change 
in the American system. No less than three authors proclaimed the 
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Roosevelt administration "revolutionary" in their titles. Pierre Lyautey 
discovered La révolution américaine', Georges Boris reported on La 
révolution Roosevelt;4 and Robert de Saint Jean considered La vraie 
révolution de Roosevelt.5 In addition, Bertrand de Jouvenel entitled 
two of his chapters devoted to the New Deal "La révolution des idées" 
and "La révolution des faits."6 Moreover, the contents, if not the titles, 
of other French reports on the New Deal indicated that their authors 
regarded the Roosevelt administration as an important departure from 
the American tradition. 
For French observers, the change wrought by the New Deal was not 
to be measured in the number and scope of legislative enactments. The 
passage of laws was only the outward manifestation of significant changes 
of a less tangible nature which were occurring in the realm of American 
values. Robert de Saint Jean argued that 
the real revolution of Mr. Roosevelt, the one which he has 
pushed farther than the others, is of a psychological order. 
This revolution would be complete if people no longer 
waited for the golden age, if Americans stopped dreaming 
of fabulous fortunes, and coveted only honest comfort. . . . 
In any case, no one thinks of denying that the President 
has awakened American idealism; he has denounced in 
his compatriots what we French designate simply and some-
times wrongly with the pejorative term of Americanism.7 
From Saint Jean's point of view, the most significant feature of the New 
Deal was its deliberate effort to reform American values. President 
Roosevelt was in apparent accord with the campaign against American-
ism, which French critics had begun in the twenties. 
Saint Jean's conception of the struggle waged by Roosevelt against 
"Americanism" was cast in the terms which Roosevelt had chosen in his 
first inaugural speech. Christ was driving the money changers from the 
temple. The American people, who once accepted the "promises of the 
sovereign tempter, the Satan of Wall Street, who strews at the feet of the 
skycrapers the treasures of the World" were now prepared to join 
Roosevelt in a holy war against materialism.8 This was evident in other 
facets of public life in the United States. Saint Jean devoted a chapter 
of his book to the struggle of "Savonarole contre Morgan" in which he 
applauded the radio campaign of Father Coughlin against the leading 
figures of American capitalism, with special focus on J. P. Morgan, Jr. 
For Saint Jean, the New Deal was a modern version of the Christian 
revolt against pagan values. 
Saint Jean's view of the Roosevelt administration was corroborated 
by the reports of other observers in somewhat different terms. This was 
evident in Bernard Fay's remarks on the significance of the election of 
1932. "After the intoxication of prosperity, happiness, science, and ex-
pansion in all directions, the United States enters a difficult period where 
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she must learn to appreciate more fully the pleasures of intelligence, 
discipline, and choice. The election of 1932 is not simply a defeat for 
Mr. Hoover, or Wall Street, or optimism a la Ford, but also for the 
machine and science."9 The political and economic aspects of the elec-
tion seemed far less important to Fay than the apparent repudiation of 
old values. Fay's endorsement of this change was made clear by his 
selection of chapter titles. The twenties were described in a unit called 
"l'Amérique perdue," while the chapter on the New Deal was entitled 
'TAmérique se retrouve." Fay was particularly impressed by the will-
ingness of the United States to devalue the dollar. Although the Roose-
velt administration certainly hoped that this measure would stimulate 
the economy and return the country to a condition of prosperity, Fay 
applauded devaluation because it proved that Americans were now in-
different to material possessions.10 Human needs took precedence over 
property. 
In Bertrand de Jouvenel's opinion, the revolution which the New 
Deal had brought about consisted largely in the new-found concern 
among Americans for the public as opposed to the private domain. 
"For a Frenchman, the most astonishing characteristic of America in 
1931 was the absence of any patriotism in the ruling classes. Bankers, 
professors, and politicians all appeared to feel no responsibility for the 
destinies of the nation. This indifference was not caused by egotism, but 
rather by a universal timidity . . . Roosevelt has created a national men-
tality, a civic spirit transcending local borders."11 Unlike Fay and Saint 
Jean, Jouvenel did not maintain that materialism had been overcome by 
the New Deal, but he did agree that the selfish concern of individuals 
for their own interests had been diminished. In this sense, Jouvenel too 
was describing a change in values. 
Another way of characterizing the revolution was to speak of the shift 
in power from Wall Street to Washington. Jouvenel dramatized this de-
velopment in his description of the hearings of the Senate Banking and 
Currency Committee. Ironically, these hearings had been instituted 
with the blessing of President Hoover, but their findings reached the 
public just as Roosevelt was taking office. The most dramatic revelation 
at the hearings was the fact that J. P. Morgan, Jr., had paid no income 
tax in the United States between 1929 and 1933. This information was 
elicited from Morgan by the Committee counsel, Ferdinand Pecora, a 
Sicilian immigrant, which seemed to establish symbolically the shift in 
power from Wall Street bankers to the new rulers in Washington repre-
senting the lower and lower middle classes.12 
Other observers remarked on the emergence of Washington as a new 
center of power in the American system. Pierre Lyautey entitled one of 
his chapters "Qui sera le maître? Washington ou New-York?"; after 
examining the question in the light of the events of 1933, Lyautey con-
cluded that Wall Street's domination of American life was at an end.1^ 
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The same issue was raised in other terms by Robert de Saint Jean. He 
contrasted the indifference among Americans to the whole political 
process in the twenties with the new interest in the activities in Wash-
ington. It was evident that the exclusive concern for the pursuit of 
wealth was at an end.14 
Bernard Fay called attention to still another aspect of the shift in 
power which occurred in 1933. The struggle between Morgan and 
Pecora, which Bertrand de Jouvenel had found so revealing, concealed 
a somewhat different lesson for Fay: "Mr. Pecora, a good Italian, was 
transplanted in his youth from the laughing shores of the Mediterranean 
to the frigid coasts of the Atlantic, but he is still gifted with the elo-
quence which formerly inspired Cicero and which still today gives dis-
tinction to Mussolini. Mr. Pecora began torturing Mr. Morgan. The 
Italian verb, the preletarian zeal, and the political skill" were all 
weapons designed to undermine Anglo-Saxon domination.15 In effect, the 
struggle against materialism was heightened by the ethnic conflict. The 
victory of Washington over Wall Street, of Pecora over Morgan, of 
idealism over materialism was also the beginning of the decline of Anglo-
Saxon control in America. 
The revolutionary character of the New Deal was confirmed as well 
by the creation of the Brain Trust. Most French observers were de-
lighted and surprised by the role of the intellectual in Roosevelt's ad-
ministration. Once again, the contrast of the present with the twenties 
was enlightening. The former dominance of businessmen was attributed 
by Bernard Fay to the nation's value system; Americans preferred action 
to thought. The collapse of the economy, however, destroyed the pres-
tige of the business classes. Their inability to find a solution to the 
Depression forced Americans to seek help from other quarters. The 
Brain Trust, according to Fay, provided the President with new ideas 
without restricting his freedom of movement. More important, "the 
underhanded blow which the upper bourgeoisie hoped to strike against 
him [Roosevelt] was parried by a few small professors."16 They not only 
strengthened the impression that the new administration was creating a 
moral revolution against the reign of materialism, but also increased the 
power of the New Deal to curb big business. 
The ideological alliance of the Brain Trust with the little man was 
also praised by Pierre Lyautey who accordingly characterized the Roose-
velt government as "popular and intellectual." Lyautey, like Fay, saw 
the intellectuals as an instrument to attack the interests of big business. 
The new power of the Brain Trust suggested the commitment of the 
nation to intellectual rather than material concerns.17 
A few travelers expressed mild reservations about the role of intellec-
tuals in the New Deal. André Maurois was somewhat dubious about the 
efforts of professors—as opposed to more practical men—to seek solutions 
for complex economic problems.18 Nonetheless, Maurois and other 
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French observers, who were themselves "intellectuals," identified with 
an administration which gave both power and prestige to Americans of 
similar professional backgrounds. The Brain Trust was just one of a 
number of factors which convinced French travelers that Roosevelt had 
brought about a revolution in American life. 
The New Deal affected not only the character of the government in 
Washington and the business classes, but made its deepest mark on the 
attitudes of ordinary Americans. These attitudes could be measured, as 
Jules Romains suggested, by attempting to describe "the human atmos-
phere, or—to borrow an expression, that Maurois has brought into 
fashion—the change in the moral and social climate/'19 In the twenties, 
Frenchmen had identified the typical American as a Babbitt. Now, ac-
cording to Luc Durtain, America had entered the age of Roosevelt.20 
Smugness and optimism were no longer the trademarks of the American 
character. André Siegfried noted the same transition. "Babbitt ap-
peared to be the definitive American type just after the great war. To-
day, he has gone out of fashion. The jobless wanderer and the distressed 
student in search of a job will no doubt be antiquated in the future."21 
Siegfried tended to regard the Depression as an untypical period, but 
admitted that it had made at least temporary marks on the national 
character. 
André Maurois also hailed the end of the age of Babbitt and the 
emergence of a new America. During his first visit to the United States 
in 1927 Maurois strongly criticized the absence of family life and the 
rigid conformity of individuals to social norms. In Maurois' view, Amer-
icans were far too concerned with the acquisition of material goods, a 
condition which bred bland optimism among the American people. 
When Maurois returned to the United States in 1931 to teach at 
Princeton University, he claimed that the emphasis on material values, 
characteristic of the twenties, had disappeared; Americans now under-
stood suffering, which made them more sympathetic to the problems of 
Europe.22 Maurois also noted the development of a more reflective 
atmosphere among ordinary Americans, the counterpart of the Brain 
Trust at higher levels. In the twenties, Americans "posed no problems. 
Thinking was suspect, dangerous, unhealthy." The Depression had 
forced Americans to think as well as suffer. The economic crisis, how-
ever, had not created a morose atmosphere. On the contrary, with the 
repeal of Prohibition, America had become a more lively place. Maurois 
remarked with enthusiasm that "Puritanism is in retreat. . . ,"23 
It was this same decline of Puritanism, related to the rise of non-
Anglo-Saxon ethnic elements, which pleased Jules Romains. He thor-
oughly enjoyed the less refined aspects of New York including the crowds 
in Times Square and Coney Island. Their air of gaiety caused Romains 
to speak of the pervasive meridional atmosphere in Manhattan. The 
city had an electric climate like Nice. It could boast of a population 
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of Mediterranean origin including Jews and Italians. Even "if the 
Irish are geographically of northern origin, their character traits and 
their religious and moral culture are unmarked by their origin."24 
French observers in the twenties had found Celts and Latins in the 
United States, but they were confronted by the overwhelming domina-
tion of the Anglo-Saxons. By 1935, the Nordic elements no longer estab-
lished the tone of American life. The demise of Morgan before Pecora's 
onslaught found its counterpart in the American streets. 
The retreat of Puritanism was a logical counterpart of the decline of 
Anglo-Saxon influence. Romains, like Maurois, rejoiced at the repeal of 
Prohibition and the decline of materialism during the Depression. He 
deplored the negative effects of Prohibition. "This absurd system had 
managed to destroy the daily savor of life, . . . impregnate the atmos-
phere with constraint and a subtle and polymorphous hypocrisy, create 
suspicion in the eyes of perfectly honest people and in their expression 
a recess of fraud." The end of Prohibition had a special importance for 
Frenchmen. Its enactment had indicated the hostility of Americans to 
French values. With its repeal, the French could once again believe in 
the compatibility between French and American values. 
Romains was equally harsh in his condemnation of the materialism 
of the twenties and for similar reasons. 
the period of rising prosperity and smugness permitted no 
gaiety in the appearance of New York. . . . Neither a man 
nor a people can enjoy life if every minute of leisure 
granted to them is experienced as a missed opportunity to 
earn money. Americans, since the Crash, have lost neither 
their confidence nor their optimism. However, they realize 
that they have made mistakes and will make them again. 
They take themselves less seriously. They have learned the 
nuances of doubt and of smiling.25 
The paradoxical assertion by French visitors that the Depression was 
a happy era reflects their own distaste for mass production and Prohibi-
tion. Now that Americans had apparently repudiated these social con-
straints, they seemed to be both freer and happier as a result. So 
concerned were travelers with the themes of technology and race that 
little was said about the feelings or the condition of the millions of 
unemployed Americans. 
The conviction of French critics that there was a decisive change in 
the human atmosphere in America forced them to restate their concep-
tion of the relationship between European and American civilizations. 
In the twenties, French critics had deplored the stress on materialism 
and Puritanism in the United States. Now that these values were in 
decline, the cultural breach between the two continents seemed to dis-
appear. As Pierre Lyautey explained, America "has built a way of life 
which was only known in Europe heretofore . . . America used to be a 
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factory. Art, Esthetics and the mind were the exclusive concerns of 
Europe. Now the United States is turning inward, and, in a few years, 
the former pupils will have developed an autonomous spiritual life re-
quiring only exchanges with Europe."26 
In attempting to assess the change in the American character wrought 
by the New Deal, French observers naturally looked to President Roose-
velt himself. The personality of the President, especially in contrast to 
Hoover's was striking evidence that the human atmosphere in the 
United States had indeed undergone a revolution. The French, of 
course, continued to nourish grievances against the former President for 
his opposition to their views on War debts as well as disarmament.27 
No doubt this disagreement accounted in part for the reaction to 
Hoover's defeat in 1932. "There is nobody in France who does not 
acclaim from the bottom of his heart the failure of Mr. Hoover. In our 
anguish, it is a smile, a ray of sunlight . . . the intoxicating odor of an 
enemy dead."28 
Most observers focused their discussion on differences of personality 
between the two men. After meeting Roosevelt at a press conference, 
Raymond Recouly contrasted Roosevelt's warmth with Hoover's diffi-
culties in communication. The contrast was strengthened in Recouly's 
mind by Roosevelt's ability to speak French. In comparison, Hoover 
seemed a provincial figure.29 Even André Siegfried, who did not disguise 
his hostility to the inflationary objectives of the New Deal program, 
found Roosevelt personally attractive. "He gives the impression of a 
human being who understands you and wants to help you. He is ex-
tremely seductive; his smile is irresistible. When he tells you at a recep-
tion, 1 am happy to see you,' he gives you the impression that he be-
lieves it, and you feel taken into his confidence."30 
The press conference and the reception were not the only instruments 
by which Roosevelt conveyed to Frenchmen a sense of personal warmth. 
Henri Dubreuil argued that the Fireside Chat was an equally effective 
institution, especially because it enabled Roosevelt to appeal to the 
average citizen. "This is not the language of a statesman who delivers a 
solemn address from the top of a platform to the concentric seats of a 
Parliament. This is not the language of a European 'intellectual' who 
never forgets that he is a cultured man, and speaks a literary language 
which 'the man in the street' only understands in part. This is rather 
the calm conversation of a man speaking to his friends in some private 
meeting, in order to explain some difficulties, and invite them to help 
him to better understand them."31 
While these judgments of individual personalities and the public 
mood were fundamental to the claim that a revolution was under way, 
Frenchmen did not entirely neglect the New Deal program itself. In-
deed, a number of the bills supported by Roosevelt provided additional 
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evidence for the French observer of the revolutionary character of the 
administration. 
The New Deal program which was described in the studies of French 
observers bears little resemblance to accounts of that movement by 
American historians. While considerable attention was given to certain 
phases of Roosevelt's program such as the NRA, the AAA, and monetary 
reforms, other developments including the CCC, TVA, and WPA were 
rarely mentioned. 
To many French critics, indeed, the NRA was not only a central 
feature of the New Deal, but it was considered the only important ele-
ment in Roosevelt's program.32 André Siegfried, for example, referred 
to the NRA as the economic solution of the thirties and contrasted it 
with Fordism which he regarded as the typical solution of the twenties. 
The NRA stressed high prices and limited production, precisely the 
contrary of Fordism. In analyzing the New Deal, Siegfried argued that 
a single policy could be identified and described as the essence of F.D.R.'s 
program.33 
Other critics adopted his methods. Henri Dubreuil entitled his vol-
ume Les codes de Roosevelt, and omitted most other efforts of the New 
Deal to solve the Depression. One reason for the exaggerated importance 
given to the NRA is evident from Robert de Saint Jean's chapter on 
"La Campagne du NRA." He and others found it difficult to ignore 
the spectacular features of this operation, including the parades, the 
blue eagle, and most of all, General Johnson and his pronouncements.34 
French observers were quick to deny that the New Deal was tainted 
by any of the contemporary ideologies towards which Europeans were 
then turning for solutions to their problems. That Roosevelt occupied 
a middle ground somewhere between the extremes of Communism and 
Fascism was bound to be an attractive state of affairs for liberal and 
conservative observers, who admitted the necessity of reforms, but had 
little taste for totalitarian solutions. André Maurois saw the significance 
of the New Deal in precisely these terms. "For the first time, a non-
revolutionary head of state has refused to tolerate the indefensible scan-
dal by which abundance, accompanied by misery, becomes a necessary 
law of nature."35 
Even those authors who considered the New Deal a revolution saw 
no link between the Roosevelt administration and European revolu-
tionary movements. According to Georges Boris, all European theorists 
of a doctrinaire bent were bound to be hostile to the New Deal because 
of its experimental character. By European standards, even the mem-
bers of the Brain Trust were empiricists. Boris especially cautioned his 
readers not to confuse Roosevelt with Hitler or Mussolini, who had no 
respect for the democratic tradition. The success of Roosevelt in achiev-
ing the passage of his program would not prevent the Congress from 
revising or eliminating parts of the New Deal.30 
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Boris* version of the nature and sources of the New Deal was ac-
cepted without qualification by Saint Jean and Romains. According to 
Saint Jean, the New Dealers' methods bore no resemblance to Cartesian 
nationalism, or any other European system. Both authors agreed that 
Roosevelt's program was rooted in the American tradition of pioneer 
empiricism.37 Moreover, despite accusations to the contrary, Roosevelt 
was no totalitarian. Saint Jean explained: ''Mr. Roosevelt has strength-
ened the state without enslaving man." The blue eagle ought not to be 
confused with the swastika or the hammer and sickle.38 
If most French critics were relieved that the Roosevelt Revolution 
was being conducted in a democratic fashion, many were pleased to note 
that capitalism had survived the crisis. Indeed, Henri Dubreuil believed 
that the NRA codes were designed to aid the recovery of the free enter-
prise system, rather than destroy it.30 His fellow advocate of assembly-
line techniques, Emile Schreiber, evidently agreed. Schreiber was par-
ticularly impressed by the absence of violence and class hatred in 1934, 
despite the upheaval which the American system was undergoing.40 
Only one aspect of the New Deal program drew consistent criticism 
from French travelers. Almost all conservatives objected to the infla-
tionary schemes of the administration. André Siegfried referred to the 
"mad policy of spending and government subsidies" undertaken by 
Roosevelt,41 while André Maurois refused to believe that these policies 
helped the United States to recover from the Depression.42 Somewhat 
more extreme was Lucien Page who devoted an entire volume to a 
critique of the devaluation of the dollar.43 With the exception of Page 
and Siegfried, however, disapproval of particular reforms rarely led to a 
condemnation of the whole New Deal. As an alternative to Communism 
and Fascism, the Roosevelt administration elicited the sympathy of most 
French observers. 
It is understandable that French critics would see in the New Deal 
program a uniquely American phenomenon, rooted in the American 
tradition. In the early thirties, the contrast between the Roosevelt ad-
ministration and Hitler and Stalin must have seemed striking indeed. 
What is far less clear is how the American tradition could have generated 
such a revolution, especially considering the French belief that before 
the New Deal, American civilization had been synonymous with ma-
terialism. The supposed source of the revolution, pioneer empiricism, 
had been blamed by French critics for generating the exclusive interest 
in mass production which had characterized American life in the twen-
ties. Either the account of American materialism was wrong or else the 
New Deal stemmed from some other source. 
Indeed, in the earlier discussion of a revolution in values, French-
men had implied at points, and stated explicitly elsewhere, that the new 
values which emerged in America during the Depression had their source 
outside the country. Saint Jean had pointed to the Christian inspiration 
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for the New Deal, while Maurois and Romains, stressing the gaiety and 
intellectuality of Roosevelt's America, discovered Latin and Celtic in-
fluence in America. The sympathy of French critics for the United 
States in the thirties was based on the conviction that the new America 
had adopted European values. While French critics agreed that Amer-
icans were rebelling against their old values, they claimed that the source 
of the rebellion was at once within and outside of the American tradi-
tion. The tension might have been reconciled but critics never addressed 
themselves to the issue. 
To complicate matters further, French observers not only proclaimed 
the New Deal a revolution, but continued to argue that the old Amer-
ican system had survived the revolution intact. They were certain that 
the revolution had occurred, but it was equally clear that most of the 
old institutions were in place. The continuity between the twenties and 
the New Deal was especially evident in the work of André Siegfried. He 
was, of course, obliged to recognize the Depression and the steps taken 
to remedy it. However, after admitting that the crisis might produce an 
aging effect on America, Siegfried confessed that "certain things which 
persist below the surface, could wrell reappear. . . . It sometimes happens 
that the conviction of youth survives youth itself/'44 According to Sieg-
fried, the Depression had produced no lasting effect on the United States. 
The country remained optimistic, and was still the land of prosperity. 
Other critics agreed with Siegfried on the persistence of old traits. 
Although the architect of a revolution against earlier values, F.D.R. 
was regarded by Saint Jean as a typical American. His "infantile joy" 
suggested the youthfulness of the American character, in vivid contrast 
to the sophistication of the French character. The President's childish 
behavior was evident in his proposal to create a Children's Day as a 
counterpart to Mother's Day; it was also revealed when Roosevelt made 
the cutting of the turkey on Thanksgiving Day into a public ceremony.45 
There was much evidence, as well, to support Siegfried's contention 
that, despite the Depression, America remained the land of prosperity. 
Jules Romains observed in 1936 that the American worker was still two 
or three times better off than his French counterpart. Thanks to the 
machine, prices were low and salaries were high in the United States.40 
Even in 1933, Emile Schreiber was surprised to find the crowds of New 
York just as elegant, noisy, and active as before the War. The whole of 
New York, including Harlem, exhibited no signs of misery.47 Although 
he recognized the existence of pockets of poverty in the South, André 
Maurois found the United States a flourishing land in comparison with 
Europe. The universities were full, the cinemas and popular restaurants 
heavily patronized. Despite the Depression, the common man in the 
United States was far better off than the average European.48 
A number of French observers, especially André Maurois and Jules 
Romains, argued that the suffering produced by the Depression had 
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radically changed America, thus diminishing the cultural gap between 
the Old World and the New. André Siegfried also considered these 
claims as the new French passenger ship, the Normandy, docked in New 
York harbor in 1935. 'Tor several hours, I felt closer to Europe and 
France, and I was clearly aware of the link between continents which 
was established by putting such a boat into service." Improved trans-
portation and communication did nothing, however, to alter the cul-
tural gap between the continents. "It's the impression of distance and 
separation which remains dominant in my mind. Europe's clamors 
reach here no doubt, but are confused, distant, and softened. Europe 
and America form two continents, and the opposition would be more 
marked if we added: Old Europe and new continent."49 
When Siegfried returned to America in 1938, it was evident that the 
cultural gap noted three years earlier had not diminished. He remarked, 
"When we speak of the New WTorld, we often believe that we are em-
ploying simply a verbal expedient. In fact we are saying the most pro-
found thing we can say about America." The geographic differences 
between two worlds were reflected in the rise of two radically different 
civilizations.50 These differences were symbolized by the April 1933 en-
counter between Herriot and Roosevelt which Emanuel Bourcier de-
scribed in terms of "The Old World opposite the New."51 The Depres-
sion and the New Deal, which led some observers to the conclusion that 
the gap between the two worlds had decreased, merely confirmed in the 
minds of others the separation between the continents. 
In other respects, as well, the America of the twenties escaped un-
scathed by poverty and the repeal of Prohibition, in the estimation of 
French critics. Despite setbacks in automobile production and heavy 
unemployment in Detroit, Siegfried proclaimed in 1935 that "America's 
heartbeat is in Detroit. I know of no American city which better re-
flects the development of postwar United States." He added, "If you 
haven't seen the assembly line at Ford, you haven't seen America."52 
Other reporters went to Washington to understand the United States in 
1933 but Siegfried still regarded the assembly line as the single most 
noteworthy feature of American life. Here was major evidence of con-
tinuity between the twenties and the New Deal. 
Other French observers were also impressed with the continued im-
portance of new industrial methods in American life. Despite the Revo-
lution américaine accomplished by F.D.R., Pierre Lyautey insisted that 
America was still the land of factories.53 Jules Romains did not hesitate 
to point up the similarities between American Capitalism and Soviet 
Communism. "Because of [America's] stress on machines and technology 
as well as the industrialized and rationalized atmosphere with which it 
surrounds man, an American would be less uprooted and disturbed by 
Communism than many Western Europeans."54 The New Deal had 
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done nothing to alter the enthusiasm oi' Americans for industrial 
progress. 
The persistence of Americanism was especially obvious in the realm 
of agriculture. André Siegfried recommended that American farmers 
abandon the single crop and learn French peasant prudence.55 He was 
joined by André Maurois, who found that "too many American farmers 
are businessmen." Maurois observed "not far from New York, a dairy 
farm which seems to emerge from your Scènes de la vie future, Du-
hamel."50 To this standardization on the land, Maurois preferred the 
self-sufficient farmers of his native Perigord. Even Henri Dubreuil, the 
persistent advocate of American industrial methods, opposed commer-
cial farming. In his opinion, the peasant class is "the only one which 
has assured the perenniality of nations."57 All French reporters ap-
plauded New Deal measures to reconstitute small farms in America, 
but felt, as did André Maurois, that a greater effort was needed in this 
direction. 
The standardization of agriculture and industry in the United States 
continued to have its effects on American communities and the Ameri-
can people. Robert de Saint Jean regretted the absence of regional di-
versity in the nation, and André Siegfried continued to argue that all 
American towns resembled Main Street. It is not surprising that such a 
monotonous human environment should appear to discourage the devel-
opment of individuality in the American character. Regarded by some 
Frenchmen as an outdated symbol of the American character, Babbitt 
remained for André Siegfried the typical American.58 
If French critics were certain that the New Deal was a revolution, it 
nonetheless had not affected the American character, which remained 
basically childish and conformist. It had not altered the basic form of 
the economy, which was still oriented towards mass production. In these, 
respects, critics agreed that American civilization continued to provide a 
vivid contrast to French and European life. 
The contrast was reenforced by the persistent belief that the Amer-
ican experience was shaped by the Anglo-Saxon heritage. This belief 
was unaffected by the claim of French critics that the New Deal was evi-
dence of a decline in Anglo-Saxon control of American life. Few critics 
disputed Pierre Lyautey's judgment that in spite of the Roosevelt ad-
ministration, "Protestant America remains."59 
Even President Roosevelt himself was unable to escape identification 
as a member of the dominant race. This was clear in Emmanuel Bour-
cier's description of the Roosevelt-Herriot meeting as a confrontation 
between "The American and the Latin."60 Bernard Fay was more ex-
plicit. For Fay, the United States was still a cultural extension of Eng-
land, and Roosevelt a typical representative of the American people. 
"Franklin Roosevelt is an Anglo-Saxon. With his Dutch name and his 
French blood, he is the descendant of a race in which the Anglo-Saxon 
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element has been dominant. The American people elected him because 
he was an Anglo-Saxon." Like other Anglo-Saxon leaders such as Wash-
ington and Jefferson, Roosevelt, in Fay's view, was intellectually dull. 
This attribute of the race was a blessing because it enabled Anglo-Saxons 
to avoid the interminable discussions which prevented Latin countries 
from achieving progress.01 Such an analysis was especially puzzling, be-
cause Fay had previously seen the struggle between Pecora and Morgan 
as symbolizing the end of Anglo-Saxon control in America. Now he 
argued that the New Deal was itself the creation of the Anglo-Saxon 
mentality. 
Other critics, like Pierre Lyautey, applied this theory of the Anglo-
Saxon origins of the New Deal in somewhat modified form. Lyautey in-
dicated that "The Roosevelts' Dutch origins have spared them the nar-
rowness of New England Puritanism. Their Anglo-Saxonism has been 
rejuvenated by American battles/'62 At least one critic argued that 
Roosevelt's program, as well as his personality, derived from his Anglo-
Saxon heritage. The adoption of an inflationary policy by F.D.R. was 
regarded by Lucien Page as a typical response to economic problems by 
an Anglo Saxon statesman.63 
The claim that America remained under Anglo-Saxon domination 
was verified by numerous French observers. André Siegfried contrasted 
the American with the Latin attitude toward the law. "We Latins pass 
laws, but never enforce them 100%; that is why life in the Latin coun-
tries is always easy, charming, and human, although disordered."64 This 
attitude toward the law helped to account for the greater individualism 
of Latin societies. On the other hand, the claim that Anglo-Saxons were 
individualists was only a "cliché" in the opinion of Jules Romains; 
moreover, like all Anglo-Saxons, Americans were conformists.65 The 
constraints which ruled the society were especially apparent in aesthetic 
matters. Robert de Saint Jean offered as evidence of the survival of 
Puritanism an anecdote about a woman's college in the midwest which 
removed a Venus de Milo statue from the campus to avoid overstimulat-
ing male visitors.66 
Other evidence of Anglo-Saxon domination of America was pro-
vided when French travelers discovered those enclaves in America which 
were still characterized by Latin behavior. André Siegfried contrasted 
French Canadian culture with the dominant Anglo-Saxon tradition. "In 
this America which we call the New World, it [French Canada] repre-
sents a tradition and is the symbol of stability. It thus maintains a 
philosophy of life which is similar to that of our peasants, in the midst 
of a continent where radically different cultural traditions are develop-
ing."67 Other travelers looked to the United States proper for evidence 
of the survival of Latin behavior. Charleston and San Francisco were 
favorite spots for Frenchmen, along with the perennial Latin center of 
New Orleans. Raymond Recouly and Emile Schreiber recalled their 
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visits with Huguenot families in Charleston.08 Recouly also praised the 
French atmosphere of San Francisco while Schreiber asked rhetorically, 
"Is it because the Spaniards and numerous Latins who live there have 
given it a character closer to our conceptions," that we enjoy San Fran-
cisco?69 The preferred behavior of Latins implied the existence of a 
dominant Anglo-Saxon culture which continued to exhibit features 
strongly distasteful to Frenchmen. 
The preoccupation of French travelers with the two aspects of Amer-
icanism suggests the degree to which they were bound by the concerns 
of the twenties. While most Americans have seen the New Deal as a 
response to the problems of the Depression, Frenchmen came seeking 
evidence that United States had recognized her mistakes of .the twenties, 
and had adopted a higher set of goals. Given these preoccupations, 
Frenchmen placed special emphasis on certain developments, which have 
seemed less important to Americans, such as the repeal of Prohibition, 
the rise of the Brain Trust, the NRA, and the personality of the Presi-
dent. While this selective attention tends to distort the New Deal taken 
as a political movement, it is perhaps fairer to consider French critics as 
commentators on American culture as a whole. In this regard, their 
perception of the central importance of ethnic and technological issues 
is more pertinent. However, even this perception is marred by the care-
lessness with which they considered the implications of some of the New 
Deal developments. Poverty and the repeal of Prohibition did not guar-
antee the fall of Puritanism any more than the rise of the Brain Trust 
was proof of America's conversion to intellectual values. Frenchmen 
were too quick to conclude that the New Deal was a revolution, and, at 
the same time, too slow to abandon their narrow vision of the America 
of the twenties. They made no effort to reconcile the tension between 
their claim that the New Deal was a revolution and the belief that 
Americanism had survived the Depression untarnished. In large part this 
failure stemmed from the too rigid conception of the United States in 
the twenties. This conception was both carried over into the thirties and 
repudiated at the same time. Babbitt and Roosevelt managed to coexist 
in separate compartments of the French mind. 
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